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“Reunion and Reconciliation, Reviewed and Reconsidered”  
 
Nina Silber 
 
At the close of the Civil War in 1865, many Americans began talking about 
“reunion” and “reunification”, even “healing” and “reconciliation”, although 
the precise meaning of those words would remain perpetually elusive. 
Indeed, from 1865 down to the present day, these sentiments would 
reverberate in American culture and American politics, sounded at 
gatherings of Union and Confederate veterans and then of their descendants, 
in the pages of newspapers and magazines in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, in the speeches of presidents and politicians, and in 
countless films and theatrical productions that imagined northern and 
southern men joining hands in unity and fraternal love. Two years after 
Appomattox, the former abolitionist Gerrit Smith told of his longing “for a 
heart-union between the North and the South.” Seventy-one years later, in a 
final gathering of ancient soldiers on the once blood-soaked fields of 
Gettysburg, Franklin Roosevelt dedicated an “Eternal Light Peace” 
memorial and honored the “joint and precious heritage” that Gettysburg had 
come to symbolize. Speaking in July 1938 to the “men who wore the blue 
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and men who wore the gray”, FDR praised all the soldiers, “not asking under 
which flag they fought then – thankful that they stand together under one 
flag now.” Roosevelt’s tribute to a peace-loving and unified America, 
coming at this moment when the world was poised on the brink of an even 
more catastrophic war, may have offered its own small measure of comfort 
to anxious Americans.1  
Historians, too, acknowledged the mood. In 1937 Paul Buck, an 
assistant professor at Harvard who had previously written on the US 
National Park system, published The Road to Reunion, the first sustained 
historical treatment of the bumpy path towards national reunification. With a 
clearly whiggish bent, Buck’s work celebrated a “new spirit” and “new 
energy” battling against the “inertia” of tradition. The Road to Reunion 
hailed the new generation intent on progress and economic growth – a key 
chapter was titled “Young Men Growing Up” – willing to bury the old 
sectional hostilities in favor of a new nationalism. Men like Henry Grady, 
Edward Atkinson, and Joel Chandler Harris received Buck’s praise for 
embodying a new ethos of economic progress and promoting a new level of 
inter-sectional understanding. The election of Democrat Grover Cleveland in 
1884 marked a welcome turning point, in Buck’s estimation, in breaking an 
earlier era’s partisan stranglehold that had made sectionalism the dominant 
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motif in national politics. Although Buck did not completely ignore race, he 
tellingly pushed the issue aside until the end of the book, no doubt seeing 
here a problem that defied his essentially optimistic narrative. Ultimately 
Buck argued that the South’s methods of “handling” its race problem, 
through segregation, peonage, and disenfranchisement, “permitted a degree 
of peace between North and South, hitherto unknown.” At a time when the 
South appeared as the nation’s foremost “economic problem”, Buck’s work 
reminded depression-era Americans of their long-standing commitment to 
this troubled region. The book went on to win the Pulitzer Prize in 1938 and 
remained, for decades, the foremost scholarly word on post-Civil War 
reconciliation.2  
In the last twenty-five years or so, numerous scholars have revisited 
the reunion theme, significantly challenging Buck’s argument. One group of 
scholars – including this author – documented the late nineteenth century 
triumph of reconciliationist sentiments but with a far less benign view of 
reconciliation’s costs. Bringing sections together, these historians say, 
intensified the nation’s embrace of white supremacy, and patriarchy, while 
pushing the country further away from even a tentative commitment to racial 
equality. A more recent set of scholars, in contrast, takes issue with the 
“reunion framework”, and considers reconciliation as something far more 
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contested, limited and problematic. The “conventional” approach, these 
scholars argue, has narrowed the historiography on the post-Civil War US, 
making it harder to see, and fully appreciate, the views of white southerners 
who insisted on the correctness of their cause, or African Americans who 
flatly rejected a whites-only reunion and long nurtured an abiding memory 
of emancipation, or Unionists who forever referred to their one-time enemies 
as “traitors”. Much of the new scholarship argues that, as one of its chief 
practitioners explains, “reconciliation was never the predominant memory of 
the war among its participants”. Approaching the problem from yet another 
perspective, a different group objects to the idea of “reunion” because they 
say it distorts the fraught relationship that evolved between postwar 
northerners and southerners, one where the South appeared as a “problem” 
that required rehabilitation, not just simple reunification.3  
 This essay seeks to understand the subject of “reconciliation” as it has 
emerged in the historical scholarship, how it has been advanced and how it 
has been challenged in the last few years. In taking up this historiographical 
overview, I have come to see how unwieldy a topic “reconciliation” is: how 
much it reaches back into the era of Reconstruction and forward into the 
twentieth century, and how much it impinges on a wide range of approaches 
– cultural, political, biographical - even extending beyond the parameters of 
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the historian’s discipline. Terminology, too, is at issue, with several scholars 
suggesting the need for a sharp delineation between “reconciliation” and 
“reunion”. Far from presenting a comprehensive look at all of this, I have 
tried to get some clarity about what it means to study “reunion” and 
“reconciliation” as well as to contemplate the relationship between 
reconciliation and the commitment to emancipation and civil rights.  
 Yet, more than this, I also hope to provide a framework that might 
offer a different path for understanding the power of the post-Civil War 
reconciliationist narrative, one that operated not in terms of group memories 
or individual recollections, but in a broader realm of cultural nationalism or 
what in this essay I refer to as “the imagined reconstitution of the nation.” 
My call for this kind of study seeks to avoid some of the more narrow 
approaches that have been taken in the study of memory – and especially to 
recognize the complex interplay between different expressions of memory – 
while also giving careful attention to the cultural work associated with the 
re-establishment of national power in the aftermath of the Civil War. 
Returning to some of the earlier scholarship on nationalism, I urge scholars 
to recognize the way national reconciliation resided in the imagination: in 
the perpetual tributes to “Blue and Gray” shaking hands or the literature of 
sentimentalized re-attachments or even in the language and literature that 
6		
	 	
identified the South as the nation’s “problem”. In looking at the imaginative 
side of reconciliation, my point is not to demarcate a realm that had no 
connection to material realities or the actual beliefs of actual people, but to 
suggest that certain ideas and formulations did achieve a place of importance 
and prestige in American culture, especially because they gained sustenance 
from the resources of dominant classes and social groups. Just as the US 
nation had to imagine itself in its initial break with the British empire, so too 
did a reimagining (or really, reimaginings) occur in the aftermath of a 
bloody and divisive civil war. These reimaginings, moreover, occurred 
amidst important changes of national consequence, including the 
strengthening of the nation state, growing economic entanglements across 
sectional lines, and the spread of a more intensely consumer-oriented 
culture. These reimaginings occurred in literature, in public monuments, in 
theatre and film, as well as on reclaimed battlefields.4 
  
By the 1980s, the time was ripe for a thorough re-examination of Paul 
Buck’s depression-era view of sectional reunification. With historians 
looking more critically at both the construction of racial categories and the 
constructed nature of national narratives, Buck’s celebratory story of 
nationalism triumphing over sectionalism seemed more like a fiction about 
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exceptional American progress than about the hard realities of racism, 
regional disparities, class oppression, and political posturing. Events of the 
Civil Rights era, as well as Richard Nixon’s “southern strategy”, likewise 
demonstrated the potentially pernicious influence the South had on national 
politics and national culture, encouraging scholars to take a far more critical 
view of what it meant for the South, as the saying went, to have really “won 
the peace”. Notable, too, was the developing consciousness about the recent 
US military debacle in Vietnam. By the 1980s, Vietnam had impressed itself 
on the American psyche, prompting more probing reflections on the 
lingering effects of war’s trauma, especially for veterans, the meaning of 
defeat in the US national narrative, and what it meant to reconcile a 
fractured nation, whether that meant healing the rift between “hawks” and 
“doves” or reuniting former foes across the sectional chasm. In a 1990 essay, 
the historian Gaines Foster compared the treatment accorded Vietnam and 
Confederate veterans, observing how southern soldiers initially won respect 
and admiration not bestowed on troops returning from Vietnam. Foster went 
on, moreover, to find striking similarities in the way white southerners and 
Americans in the aftermath of Vietnam ultimately turned wartime defeat into 
moral victory.5  
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The 1980s witnessed two other important intellectual developments 
that would be significant for the re-casting of the study of reconciliation: 
critical re-examinations of nationalism and a new-found interest in the study 
of memory. Troubled by the persistent and persistently violent effects of 
nationalism, historians and other social scientists in this decade tried to 
account for the ideological power of national belonging. Perhaps most 
notable in this regard was the work of Benedict Anderson who saw 
nationalism not as something given and immutable, but as something 
invented, created, and imagined. In his notion of the nation as an “imagined 
community”, one in which a wide and disparate group of people imagine 
their connections with one another, Anderson also highlighted the 
importance of memory. Indeed, Imagined Communities begins with a 
discussion of the tombs of Unknown Soldiers, and with the suggestion that 
in remembering past wars, people of different social classes and even 
different ethnic backgrounds have learned to think of themselves as part of a 
broader community of national subjects.6  
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger likewise developed the 
connections between memory and nationalism in their 1983 collection, The 
Invention of Tradition. Essays in this volume argued that certain rituals and 
commemorations – the celebration of Bastille Day, for example - were not 
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events of long standing but were, in fact, more recent creations that helped 
serve the interests of modern nation-building. Some of the essays, moreover, 
held particular significance for North American circumstances in suggesting 
how the rituals of a people once at war, like the Highland Scots, might 
fruitfully be absorbed into a national culture.7  
Gaines Foster did not, of course, merely substitute Confederates for 
Scottish Highlanders but his 1988 book, Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, 
the Lost Cause and the Emergence of the New South, 1865-1913 did reflect 
the influence of Hobsbawm’s and Ranger’s work. In his book, Foster laid 
some important groundwork for inquiries about post-Civil War reunification 
that would follow later, finding that the rituals associated with the Lost 
Cause, including monument unveilings and veterans reunions, far from 
drawing ex-Confederates into a fiercely sectionalist position, offered a 
perspective that pushed the post-Civil War South more firmly back into the 
national orbit. Departing from earlier and less chronologically focused 
studies, Foster maintained that a different type of Lost Cause mentality had 
evolved by the late nineteenth century, one that was less mournful and more 
celebratory, and more attuned to the needs and concerns of a popular veteran 
audience. Even more, this later Lost Cause, with its respect for discipline, 
social order, and private property, comfortably co-existed with sectional 
10		
	 	
reconciliation and “whether intentionally or not, it eased the region’s 
passage through a particularly difficult period of social change” and 
ultimately “supported the emergence of the New South” and the intensified 
nationalism of the late nineteenth century.8 
Although Foster recognized that southern white women had been 
highly visible, especially in the early phases of Confederate 
memorialization, his argument generally downplayed their long-term effect 
on the Lost Cause movement. New scholarship, more cognizant of female 
political influence, and the role of gender in shaping the political dialogue, 
had also become more prevalent during the 1980s, leading to new 
evaluations of women’s role. My own work looked at the way gender 
figured into the postwar political discourse and played a central part in 
shaping a particular type of reconciliation narrative. The Romance of 
Reunion: Northerners and the South, 1865-1900 argued that white 
northerners became beguiled by sentimentalized portraits of the South, 
drawn to an image of the region’s supposedly domesticated race relations, 
picturesque beauty, and compliant women. Worried about the unsettled 
gender roles of the new industrial order, northerners looked at southern 
white men and women with heightened sympathy and developed a greater 
willingness for inter-sectional cooperation. This re-evaluation of gender, I 
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argued, played a critical role in fostering a romantic reconciliation between 
the sections, one that took imaginative form in countless novels, short 
stories, and dramatic productions depicting the marriage of a northern white 
man with a southern white woman.9  
Perhaps the most effective, and surely the most comprehensive, 
challenge to The Road to Reunion came with David Blight’s 2001 study, 
Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory. Appearing soon 
after the demise of South African apartheid and that country’s initiation of a 
“truth and reconciliation” process, Blight considered what it meant for a 
racially divided society to embark on a process of healing and unification. 
Since the United States lacked any formal reconciliation bodies in the 
aftermath of the Civil War, Blight explored ways in which Americans, North 
and South and black and white, reflected on the sectional conflict, arguing 
how one form of reconciliation, along racial lines, had essentially been 
sacrificed in the service of another. Blight, too, was more explicit than either 
Foster or I had been about using the study of memory to understand reunion. 
Looking at how a range of groups and individuals remembered the war, he 
argued that “three overall visions of Civil War memory collided and 
combined over time”, identifying those memory streams as 
“reconciliationist,” “white supremacist” and “emancipationist”. Ultimately, 
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says Blight, “The forces of reconciliation overwhelmed the emancipationist 
vision in the national culture” and “the inexorable drive for reunion both 
used and trumped race.” Thus, by the time of the 1913 Gettysburg reunion, 
the end-point for Blight’s study, few participants focused on the issue of 
slavery that drove the sections apart, choosing instead to make tributes to 
battlefield bravery, and a generalized commitment to a cause, whatever it 
might have been, that brought the sections together.10  
 
Like Blight, other scholars who were part of this initial impulse to 
reinterpret reunion aimed to take a more expansive view of Reconstruction, 
making one of their central questions why northern whites had given up on 
the radical demands for black suffrage and citizenship, and ultimately 
became willing to acquiesce to southern white “home rule”. Scholars, in 
other words, sought to move beyond the political contingencies of the 1860s 
and 1870s - the specific electoral contests and changing partisan alliances - 
to find more deeply rooted cultural and intellectual shifts that might clarify 
the abandonment of the seemingly enlightened agenda that was born in the 
struggle against slavery and matured in the postwar Radical Republican 
program. For Edward Blum, the crucial element in what he called “the re-
forging of the white republic” was Protestant Christianity, the prevailing 
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religious outlook that helped create “a new sense of white American 
nationalism after the Civil War that sanctified the segregation of African 
Americans and their political disenfranchisement.” Heather Cox 
Richardson’s work, The Death of Reconstruction, also revisited the northern 
abandonment of reconstruction ideals by focusing on political economy. 
Richardson argued that the free labor principles of the Civil War era gave 
way to a post-war vision of labor and capital in perpetual conflict with 
African Americans increasingly viewed as fractious workers making 
unreasonable demands on the coffers of the federal government. In 
Richardson’s telling, white northerners and southerners came together, by 
the end of the nineteenth century, in their mutual fears about labor unrest 
and “negro supremacy”. 11 
Scholars who focus on art, literature, and public memorialization 
concur that reunion and reconciliation emerged as predominant themes 
throughout the post-Civil War era. Gerald Linderman argued that soon after 
the war concluded, a civilian discourse of “courage” overtook soldiers’ 
memories of horror and brutality and thus fostered a sense of Blue and Gray 
fraternity. Edward Linenthal, in his study of battlefield commemoration, 
read the Gettysburg landscape, with its acknowledgement of both Union and 
Confederate military achievements, as an embodiment of reconciliation. In 
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the widespread proliferation, north and south, of statues depicting the 
common (white) soldier, Kirk Savage also found evidence that tributes to 
white heroism overwhelmed the memory of emancipation. These and other 
works essentially created a new paradigm about sectional relations in the 
post-Civil War era, one in which white northerners gradually came to 
sympathize with white southern views about race, class, and gender. These 
shifting attitudes not only encouraged the northern retreat from 
Reconstruction, and a willingness to allow “home rule” in the southern 
states, but also helped assure northern support for the racial practices that 
would come to predominate at the end of the nineteenth century. Historians 
advance different theories to explain the reasons for, as well as the timing of, 
reconciliation’s triumph, and also take note of the various constituencies, 
North and South, white and black, that challenged the conciliatory mood. 
Still, these scholars agree that, by the end of the nineteenth century, a white-
washed reconciliation had gained the upper hand in American culture and 
that an awareness of the African American past, especially regarding slavery 
and emancipation, had been marginalized.12  
Some of these works have, like Blight’s, given pointed attention to the 
study of “collective memory”. Drawing especially on the work of sociologist 
Maurice Halbwachs – who emphasized a dynamic link between group 
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identities and collective remembering - these studies have done much to 
illuminate the various threads of the South’s “Lost Cause” as well as 
commemorations of the Union victory and black emancipation. Much of the 
new scholarship that challenges the work of Blight, Blum, and others has 
also pursued the problem of reconciliation by studying memory. Thus books 
by Caroline Janney, Barbara Gannon, and Keith Harris have explored the 
way certain constituencies, including veterans, women’s organizations, and 
African American intellectuals, have constructed memories of the past as a 
means of self-definition, even political activism. In this way, the notion of 
reconciliation has, to some extent, become nestled in a larger intellectual 
framework, one that emphasizes the dynamic process of remembering, and 
forgetting, in which memories are shaped with an eye toward the concerns 
and demands of the present.13 
Still, quite a few works have resisted the trend of studying 
reconciliation via the lens of memory. Edward Blum and Heather 
Richardson consider not memories, but ideologies associated with Protestant 
Christianity and free labor economics. Others, like Stephen Prince and 
Natalie Ring, have also pushed away from the idea of memory to explore the 
intersectional dialogue in terms of an evolving cultural and intellectual 
framework that emerged in the postwar years, one that yielded new ways of 
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thinking about white supremacy, nationalism, and imperialism. Prince, in 
fact, takes a fairly explicit stand against memory. As he explains, imagining 
a new nation meant engaging with “the southern past,” but this “should not 
blind us to the essential novelty involved in this cultural process”. In this 
regard, these historians have brought something to the discussion that is 
often lacking in the new scholarship on Civil War memory, namely a sense 
of the shifting ideological context, and a sense that people make meaning out 
of the Civil War drawing partly on memory but also, to a great extent, on the 
ideas and practices that emerge out of ever-changing historical 
circumstances. 14  
 
Whether they focus on memory or not, scholars who dispute the 
argument that reconciliation reigned triumphant by the end of the nineteenth 
century have marshaled an impressive array of evidence. As they note, 
despite the shared religious beliefs, a joint commitment to battlefield 
bravery, and commonly held attitudes about white superiority, there were 
clearly signs that sectional division persisted well into the nineteenth century 
and even beyond. As late as 1915, Union veterans in the Grand Army of the 
Republic (GAR) celebrated their victory over “rebellion, treason, slavery, 
and the degradation of human labor.” Similarly, many of the Protestant 
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denominations, including those examined by Blum, did not heal the 
sectional rift that had divided their churches during the disunion crisis until 
long after the Civil War. Methodists, in fact, remained divided until 1939. 
Nor was it clear that white reunification always meant a head-long embrace 
of Jim Crow. Northern white women of the Woman’s Christian Temperance 
Union fervently prayed for a rapprochement with their southern white sisters 
so they could together fight the demons of alcohol, explained Blum. And 
yet, as Glenda Gilmore’s work has made clear, the WCTU continued to offer 
a critical organizational base for middle-class black women of the South 
even while its leadership promoted intersectional reconciliation. These and 
other issues have opened the door to a new crop of historical writing that 
challenges the prevailing paradigm on a number of fundamental points, 
although a basic disagreement seems to be that “reunion” fails to capture the 
constantly evolving inter-sectional dialogue and the widely divergent voices 
regarding sectional loyalties. Reunion, these historians say, may have been 
celebrated on a superficial level, but conflict and dissonance ruled just below 
the surface. Although sometimes the differences between the two 
approaches seem to be largely about questions of emphasis or timing, there 
are hints, too, that scholars see something bigger at stake: while one 
perspective tends to emphasize the triumph of a white supremacist nation 
18		
	 	
state that marginalized other perspectives and gave legal sanction to Jim 
Crow, the other points to the persistence of regional and other identities, 
nurtured in competing memories about the Civil War, that continue to 
influence US society even into the present day. Using the Appomattox 
surrender as her touchstone for considering different approaches to reunion, 
Elizabeth Varon sees no single and triumphant myth about white unification 
emerging but instead implies “that Americans’ efforts to remember and 
memorialize Appomattox have been dissonant.” Perhaps, too, as some 
scholars suggest, we can learn something about our current red state/blue 
state divide if we can better appreciate “the limits of reconciliation”.15 
Northerners and southerners were, of course, critical actors in post-
Civil War reconciliation but more was involved than the attitudes of 
individual northern and southern people. Reunification also included 
institutional rebuilding – in the form of political organizations, churches, 
cultural and economic establishments – as well as the cultural myths and 
narratives people told about the war and its aftermath. With this in mind, I 
approach the challenge of studying post-Civil War reconciliation by 
developing several points for consideration. First, drawing from suggestions 
made by other scholars, I discuss some of the terms associated with this 
historical problem, specifically in terms of distinguishing “reunion” from 
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“reconciliation”. Second, I focus on the arena where scholars seem to be 
most at odds, namely on reconciliation and memory, especially the memory 
of wartime participants. Finally, I consider the question of reconciliation via 
a broader cultural lens and offer some thoughts about how we might assess 
the power of reconciliationist thinking in post-Civil War America. Here I 
will look more closely at the idea of “the imagined reconstitution of the 
nation” and how that might offer a new framework for understanding 
reconciliation.  
 
The Extended Terrain of Reunion  
Historians often remark that the Civil War was fought in over 10,000 
places. Perhaps it ended that way, too. Indeed, the amorphous and often 
intangible nature of reaching a peace suggests the war was “settled” in a 
plurality of ways, not just conceptually and geographically, but temporally 
as well. Along these lines, Caroline Janney, author of Remembering the Civil 
War, advises us to separate “reconciliation” from “reunion”. Referring to the 
latter as the “political reunification of the nation,” Janney says it “was 
achieved in the spring of 1865 and refined during Reconstruction. Reunion 
occurred immediately and unequivocally after the Civil War” while 
“reconciliation was harder to define, subject to both changing and multiple 
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interpretations.” I agree with Janney’s call to distinguish between the 
structural reconfiguration of national power – what we might call “reunion” 
- and other ways in which the nation was made whole. However, I disagree 
that something immediate and unequivocal occurred in 1865 and see, 
instead, a process that was chaotic, attenuated, and contested. In her astute 
analysis of the Appomattox surrender and its aftermath, Elizabeth Varon 
offers some clues as to just how messy reunion could be. Refuting the 
widely-held belief that Lee’s surrender to Grant initiated a period of national 
healing, Varon finds evidence of something far less settled. Did Appomattox 
signal, as Robert E. Lee and his followers believed, a “restoration” of the 
antebellum Union, one in which the South enjoyed a high degree of political 
and economic autonomy? Or was it, as Ulysses Grant proposed, the first step 
toward a “Union transformed”, one in which the federal government 
assumed a new moral authority and might even – as some white and black 
activists imagined – play a more direct role in southern life in order to insure 
a measure of racial justice and equality? These different assessments of the 
surrender, Varon shows, shaped the politics of the Reconstruction years, and 
were influential for years to come. While those assessments might be 
classified under the hard-to-define rubric of “reconciliation,” surely they 
shaped the nature, and the speed, of “reunion”.16  
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Varon’s consideration of post-Appomattox tensions suggests that 
while reunion is best approached as its own distinct sub-field, it wasn’t a 
conclusive political act, but more of a process, perpetually negotiated and re-
negotiated during the late nineteenth century, and even well into the 
twentieth. There were, of course, certain critical milestones in that process, 
especially in the years between 1865 and 1877: the re-admitting of southern 
states back into the federal union; the restoration of voting rights to former 
Confederates; the removal of federal troops from southern states. With these 
and other markers in mind, scholars have produced a multitude of studies – 
more than can be tackled in this essay - dealing specifically with reunion’s 
complicated political and economic path during the official years of 
Reconstruction. A recent and critical addition to this Reconstruction 
scholarship is Gregory Downs’ After Appomattox: Military Occupation and 
the Ends of War, which compels us to rethink Reconstruction as a 
continuation, in legal and military terms, of wartime hostilities. Downs 
offers some important tools that will likely prompt historians to 
fundamentally reconceive the Reconstruction era, but, for our purposes, one 
of his most insightful observations is to show just how attenuated the 
process of postwar reunion truly was. Thus we might say that a type of 
reunion occurred with the end of the Civil War, and then again with the end 
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of Reconstruction, but the changing character of the nation state, during the 
Progressive Era, the New Deal, even into the Civil Rights era, continued to 
put the question of the South, and its reintegration into the nation, back on 
the agenda. Moreover, each step in this process of reintegration had an 
important affect on the ideas and cultural practices that we might associate 
with “reconciliation”.17 
The work of Natalie Ring is particularly instructive in showing how 
the evolving process of “reunion” could shape a changing discourse about 
“reconciliation”. Her book, The Problem South, documents the way many 
post-war Americans, northerners especially, came to view the South from a 
far less benign perspective, as a region beset by problems of poverty, 
disease, and racial antagonism. Directing attention to these southern 
problems, says Ring, became an important part of the agenda of the new 
liberal state of the Progressive Era. Awareness of “the Problem South” 
brought new types of social scientific studies and philanthropic actions, and 
eventually government intervention as well. More generally, too, the 
“Problem South” helped create a narrative about sectional relations that was 
less about sentimental reattachments and more about stigmatizing regional 
backwardness. Of particular importance is Ring’s transnational perspective 
and her argument that the trope of “the Problem South” tended to align the 
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region with a narrative of colonialism, as a place in need of imperial uplift. 
“It is no coincidence,” Ring argues, “that the interventionist state’s efforts to 
solve the ‘southern problem’ and reformers’ increasing reliance on social 
scientific methodology, occurred during the Age of Empire and an 
expanding global economy.”18 
Ring insightfully captures the troubled and troubling view many fin-
de-siecle Americans had about “the South” while perceptively connecting 
that view to an emerging liberal state and an imperialist mindset. Ring, 
however, prefers to talk about “readjustment” and “rehabilitation” rather 
than “reunion”; like other scholars considered here, she, too, locates her 
work in opposition to the “traditional historical narrative” that sees “the 
powerful forces of sectional reunion” triumphing over the Civil War 
hostilities of the past. But thinking about “reunion” as a process, instead of 
an act, makes Ring’s study about “readjustment” not antithetical to reunion 
but more like a phase of a larger problem; in this case, a phase in which 
many of the questions first spotlighted during Reconstruction – federal 
and/or philanthropic intervention as a means to handle southern poverty, 
educational inequalities, or race problems – assumed a new national 
significance, now in an era when imperialism offered a new global vantage 
point for constructing ideas about the US South.19 
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Ring’s work broaches on yet another topic that bears consideration in 
gaining some perspective about reunion and reconciliation: how did the 
complicated and lop-sided economic reintegration of the nation shape the 
narrative of national reunification? “Invade us…with your business,” former 
Confederate soldier Stephen D. Lee once proclaimed to a group of Union 
veterans in 1895. Henry Boynton, an ex-Union soldier and vociferous 
advocate, during Reconstruction, for federal subsidies to southern rail lines 
showed an early inclination to put northern money to work in rebuilding the 
South’s economy. Perhaps not surprisingly, Boynton also took the lead, in 
the 1890s, in the campaign to turn the Chickamauga battlefield into a shrine 
for sectional reconciliation. Yet, says Ring, even Henry Grady, one of the 
foremost champions of economic rebuilding and sectional healing, 
recognized that the South’s tremendous dependence on cotton cultivation 
could turn the ideal of sectional reunion into a reality of economic 
exploitation by one region over another. Historians might expand from 
Ring’s suggestions and productively explore the relationship between money 
and inter-sectional cooperation, perhaps looking more pointedly at joint 
economic ventures, perhaps at the way venerable Confederate institutions or 
monuments or activities were funded, or perhaps at specific individuals, like 
Grady or Boynton, to better understand the link between economics and the 
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progress, or not, of reconciliation. These examinations might further 
complicate the strict demarcation between the structural reunification of the 
nation and other forms of sectional cooperation.20  
 
The Dissonant Voices of Reconciliation 
 Much of the recent reconciliation scholarship, and the literature that 
has prompted the sharpest debates, considers reconciliation, and its limits, 
through the lens of memory, especially through the personal and collective 
responses of former combatants, both black and white. Sometimes drawing 
on similar bodies of evidence, scholars have arrived at very different 
conclusions. On the one hand, we have studies of veterans’ memoirs and 
Blue-Gray gatherings in which writers and speakers praised the common 
bravery and heroism of Union and Confederate soldiers and pointedly, at 
least in their public pronouncements, passed over areas of difference. On the 
other hand, numerous scholars argue that by looking behind the surface 
rhetoric of togetherness, there is considerable evidence of thorough-going 
hostility and a memory that was deeply rooted in the particular principles 
associated with one side or the other. Not only did white veterans insist on 
the legitimacy of their own cause, African Americans, both veterans and 
non-veterans, nurtured long-standing memories about emancipation, often 
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making explicit tributes to the work of black soldiers in the self-
emancipation project of the wartime era. Reconciliation may have been 
pervasive, but so were Lost Cause tributes, celebrations of the Union 
triumph over treason, and black efforts to tell stories about slavery, 
emancipation, and the ongoing struggle for racial justice. Two big synthetic 
works have emerged that encapsulate these differences: David Blight’s Race 
and Reunion and Caroline Janney’s Remembering the Civil War, both of 
which receive considerable attention below.  
Both points of view make connections to the “Lost Cause” scholarship 
of the 1970s and 1980s and its consideration of the way post-war white 
southerners helped construct a set of ideas that could explain their defeat, 
offer a position of honor and prestige in a rapidly changing world, and even 
provide spiritual guidance in a moment of religious confusion. A critical 
point of difference hinges on whether scholars read paeans to the Lost Cause 
as indicators of hostility to national unity, or, as Gaines Foster’s work 
suggested, as acceptance, sometimes ambiguous and sometimes enthusiastic, 
of the national enterprise. 21 
Drawing on Foster’s argument, David Blight argues that “by the turn 
of the century, the Lost Cause (as cultural practice and as a set of arguments) 
served two aims – reconciliation and Southern partisanship. “ More than 
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Foster, Blight focuses on the intertwining of Lost Cause views with the 
region’s intensifying white supremacy and finds ex-Confederates exulting in 
their triumph over Reconstruction, paying homage to the manly fortitude of 
Confederate soldiers, and waxing nostalgic over their “loyal slaves”. These 
principles, says Blight, “offered a set of conservative traditions by which the 
entire country could gird itself against racial, political, and industrial 
disorder” and so effect a “national reunion on Southern terms”. For both 
Blight and Foster, even if ex-Confederates did not explicitly champion 
reconciliation, their Lost Cause principles provided a means for white 
southerners to make themselves integral to the US nation, particularly in its 
turn toward the modern era. As Blight sees it, not only did those principles 
ease the way for southern whites back into national life, they also won the 
sympathies of an industrializing north.22  
But where some see the Lost Cause as a bridge to nationalism, other 
scholars see a bridge to nowhere. In Honoring the Civil War Dead, John 
Neff contends that mourning, especially the mourning of fallen soldiers, 
long remained an obstacle to reconciliation. “The clearest evidence of a 
persistent divergence in American society – of a lack of reconciliation,” 
argues Neff, “is found in the commemoration of the war’s soldier dead.” 
Whether mourning ordinary soldiers, Robert E. Lee, or even the death of 
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Jefferson Davis in 1889, Neff contends that white southerners strengthened 
their commitment to a distinct regional mythology. Even as the sections 
moved toward a rapprochement, the Lost Cause was reinvigorated in times 
of mourning. “Remembering the dead,” Neff argues, “proved to be an 
impediment to national healing.”23  
In William Blair’s telling, the intertwining of politics and 
memorialization also threw up impediments to bridging the sectional divide. 
During Reconstruction, says Blair, ex-Confederates were forced to push 
their politics underground, into the less threatening domain of Decoration 
Day commemorations, often under the sponsorship of southern white 
women. Even more, when Confederate political views surfaced, southern 
whites often spoke in two distinct registers: they venerated the Confederate 
past and Confederate soldiers in order to promote white political unity in the 
Democratic party, yet they also spoke the language of reconciliation in order 
to appease northern economic interests, forestall the possibility of federal 
intervention, and build a stronger coalition with northern Democrats. Yet, 
for Blair, these gestures toward reconciliation mainly served the purpose of 
political cover and did not reveal “heartfelt” motivations. Janney, too, sees 
white southerners reinvigorating their commitment to a distinct Lost Cause 
outlook, intensifying their feelings of sectionalism as a response to the 
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pressures of reunification and the need to preserve a Confederate memory of 
the war for future generations. Conceding that ex-Confederates did not 
contemplate a renewed rebellion, Janney nonetheless argues that they 
viewed the Lost Cause as “another type of war, one that sought to conquer 
the hearts and minds of the coming generations” to show them that “the 
cause of southern independence had been true and righteous, and that they 
would continue to identify with the South as a region if not a separate 
country.”24  
These different evaluations of the Lost Cause hint at different 
approaches scholars take to the study of memory. Although virtually all 
historians note the importance of understanding memory as changing, fluid, 
and under-construction, scholars who stress resistance to reconciliation also 
tend to highlight white southern attitudes that were persistent, static, and less 
responsive to changes of the modern era. By rooting Civil War remembrance 
in the honoring of the dead, John Neff suggests that commemoration itself 
reflected the way those deaths “were frozen in time”. Others also assume 
that southern sectionalism, perhaps because it emphasized local concerns 
over national ones, reflected something more deeply rooted and less subject 
to the shifting cultural and political winds of modern life. Yet, the anti-
modernist strain in Lost Cause thinking would not have isolated white 
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southerners from other Americans, including northern middle-class whites 
who sometimes reveled in a nostalgic appreciation for pre-industrial 
practices and beliefs. Likewise, what should we make of ex-Confederates 
who claimed to uphold Confederate ideas while also participating in other 
activities of the modern era, like consumerism, national elections, and mass 
forms of entertainment, practices that surely added additional layers of 
complexity to the Lost Cause mentality? Can we, to use the language of 
some scholars, see in white southerners’ professed commitment to 
Confederate principles attitudes that were more genuine or “heartfelt”? That 
seems to push historians into exceedingly murky and speculative territory.25  
Most scholarship assumes that white Unionists more readily embraced 
reconciliation since the Union goal in the Civil War had, in fact, been 
predicated on making the nation whole. “Northern white people in general,” 
says William Blair, “wanted reunification with the white South – urgently 
and more rapidly than the supporters of the Confederacy.” Janney agrees: 
“For northerners, the triumph of reunion and reconciliation was the Union 
cause.” Disagreement, though, emerges on whether white northerners 
accepted reconciliation on “southern terms”, specifically the Confederate 
tendency to venerate soldiers’ bravery over reasons for fighting, as well as 
Lost Cause principles of individual honor, patriarchal order, and white 
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supremacy. David Blight argues that white northerners increasingly accepted 
the Lost Cause account of Reconstruction’s tragedy and embraced the 
accompanying pleas for racial and social hierarchy. My own work suggests 
that northern middle-class whites found the accounts about southern race 
and gender and class relations increasingly appealing, especially in a period 
when industrialization had destabilized their own understandings about 
social and racial categories. Several scholars also see evidence of white 
Unionists moving toward an apolitical celebration of the bravery and 
courage of their soldiers – “the soldier’s faith” as Oliver Wendell Holmes 
would call it - making it possible to find common ground with former 
enemies on the basis of martial values while ignoring any discussion of what 
had brought soldiers to the battlefield in the first place. 26 
 Other historians strenuously resist the notion that Unionists bought 
into a Confederate interpretation of anything. Northern veterans, argues M. 
Keith Harris, “undertook a sustained fight to include sectional terms in a 
national commemorative ethos”, singling out “the sectional row over slavery 
as the fundamental origin of the war and [praising] emancipation as its 
righteous consequence.” More broadly, Harris argues that Union and 
Confederate veterans embraced both reconciliation and sectionalism, and 
that each group created their own sectionalized version of the reconciliation 
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narrative. Barbara Gannon likewise finds evidence of Union veterans 
reflecting on their singular accomplishments in preserving the nation and 
ending slavery. In The Won Cause Gannon examines the black and white 
veterans who joined the GAR, finding the organization unusually tolerant of 
inter-racial camaraderie and fiercely committed to a memory of the Civil 
War that stressed both Union and Liberty. In this, her work gives us a 
window into something rare and remarkable in late nineteenth century 
America: a place where white and black men worked together and respected 
one another. These men, she says, lived out their vision of what the war 
meant through their interracial posts. “Interracial comradeship,” Gannon 
writes, “epitomized the many layers and meanings of the Won Cause.” 
Janney also contends that while Union veterans may have advocated 
reconciliation they remained firm on remembering their wartime principles. 
For Unionists, she says, there was “no reconciliation based on acquiescence 
to the Lost Cause”. Like Gannon, she also believes that “for many white 
veterans the task of saving the Union could not be separated from slavery” 
and that the memory of emancipation as a central component of the Union 
cause “seemed to increase with the passing of time.”27  
 Janney, Gannon, Blair and other scholars mentioned here offer an 
important corrective to the earlier crop of reconciliation scholarship by 
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highlighting a distinctive, Unionist memory, one in which northern veterans 
remained steadfast about their wartime accomplishments, unwilling to 
acquiesce to an apolitical embrace of Confederate bravery. They insist, too, 
that remembering emancipation did not mean advocacy for civil rights, 
arguing, in effect, that northern white racism had always limited Unionists’ 
ability to think in terms of racial equality, or what Gannon refers to as “the 
fundamental compatability of accepting racial inequality and remembering 
emancipation”. White Unionists, in other words, did not buy into southern 
white supremacy since they had a racism all their own. This helps refute a 
tendency in the historical scholarship that might deny northerners 
responsibility for contributing to the racist discourse of the late nineteenth 
century. Yet, it also suggests a departure from those scholars who believe 
the struggle for emancipation may have, at least initially, pushed northern 
whites toward a deeper engagement with racial justice, perhaps even edging 
them toward an emancipationist vision. “In truth,” Neff says of postwar 
white northerners and their racial attitudes, “they had no very advanced 
position from which to retreat.” As Janney puts it, “most white Unionists 
had believed in 1861, as they did in 1865 and into the postwar years, that 
they were socially, culturally, physically, and mentally superior to African 
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Americans….They did not need to attend battlefield dedications with their 
former foes to be convinced of their racial superiority.”28  
Yet, the changing intellectual climate of Gilded Age America 
demands a more nuanced analysis that goes beyond discussions of “white 
supremacy” and “racial superiority.” This might help us understand how the 
racism of 1865 differed from the racism of 1898. Somewhere in that 
difference, we might glimpse an important intellectual shift that influenced 
the postwar sectional dialogue. Here, the work of intellectual historians, 
specifically those who have documented the postwar drift from idealism and 
romanticism and towards pragmatism and Darwinian social science seems 
particularly promising. These scholars suggest how even relatively subtle 
changes in thinking, including attitudes about race, may have opened some 
intellectual doors to reconciliation. Consider, for example, Michael 
DeGruccio’s astute analysis of Charles Francis Adams, Jr Union officer and 
a late-in-life devotee of Robert E. Lee, Adams famously paid tribute to the 
Confederate commander in speeches delivered in the early 1900s. 
DeGruccio’s biographical portrait allows him to hone in on Adams’ growing 
embrace of science in understanding race and civilization and human 
perfectibility, and as a way to make sense of his personal and professional 
failures. This scientific shift encouraged Adams’ move from romantic 
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racialism to a more thorough-going white supremacy and helped create the 
conditions for Adams’ eventual celebration of Lee. Louis Menand brings a 
similar perspective to bear in his examination of Oliver Wendell Holmes and 
his emerging pragmatist inclinations that encouraged him to reject his 
youthful abolitionism and place a higher premium on soldierly duties. The 
point, then, is not that reconciliation prompted these men to embrace white 
supremacy but rather that Adams and Holmes, and probably many others 
like them, had begun to think differently about a lot of things, including race 
and reform and military obligations, and this complex array of intellectual 
realignments helped shape the conditions that could foster a path to 
reconciliation.29  
Moreover, if white Unionists held fast to a memory of emancipation, 
even without a commitment to civil rights, it is useful to think through what 
emancipation meant to northern whites and how that memory evolved over 
time. In the years following the Civil War, white northerners frequently 
appropriated the language of emancipation in order to give moral weight to a 
variety of crusades that had little to do with the cause of ending slavery, 
from labor reform to anti-prostitution campaigns. By the 1890s, white 
Unionist invocations of emancipation may have been less about the struggle 
against chattel slavery and more about establishing a moral framework for 
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US imperialism. Speaking in 1901, a Kansas veteran celebrated his 
generation’s fight against “human slavery”, linking it to the creation of “a 
perpetual shield for human rights and orderly liberty everywhere under the 
sun.” Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, many Union veterans 
came to believe that they stood together with their former foes in this quest 
to bring “emancipation” to the blighted and “backward” regions of the 
globe. Gannon points to this as evidence of an ongoing Unionist memory 
about emancipation that could consistently be coupled with a disregard for 
civil rights. Yet perhaps the focus on memory again distorts more than it 
clarifies. Unionists may well have invoked emancipation and gestured 
toward abolition but how much does this reflect their claim to a distinctive 
memory about the Civil War when the foremost objective was to justify a 
new agenda of military expansionism?30  
If white northerners remained inconsistent, at best, in the cause of 
racial equality, African Americans, from the end of the Civil War through 
well into the twentieth century, nurtured a more deeply-rooted 
emancipationist vision. Historians, however, have diverging assessments of 
the cohesiveness and influence of the black response. In Race and Reunion, 
David Blight finds sharp divisions in the African American community 
when it came to assessing the past: Frederick Douglass’ fierce recollection 
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of slavery and emancipation as a way to promote racial justice; a desire to 
forget the shame and degradation of the slave past; an accommodationist 
approach, espoused by men like Booker T. Washington, which preferred to 
remember slavery and emancipation in ways that were least offensive to 
white southerners. Blight sees moments when black voices became part of 
the national dialogue on Civil War remembrance, but his account generally 
has a mournful tone, anticipating his central argument about the triumph of 
reconciliation and white supremacy. Ultimately, the divisions in the black 
community, coupled with powerful silences, meant that most Americans at 
the turn of the century saw slavery and emancipation through the lens of a 
Lost Cause apologist like Thomas Nelson Page rather than through the eyes 
of Frederick Douglass.31 
The counter-argument to Blight’s despondent account contends that 
African Americans, at least in the veteran community, maintained a steady 
commitment to an anti-reconciliationist position. Gannon, Janney, and others 
refute the notion that black voices may have been “overwhelmed” in the 
contest over memory; they direct attention to the frequent Memorial Day 
exercises, GAR gatherings, and Emancipation commemorations where 
African American men and women reminded listeners about the fortitude 
and heroism of black soldiers and especially about the unquestioned loyalty 
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and patriotism of black veterans. The presence of black soldiers in the GAR, 
argues Gannon, “challenged the Civil War Memory that hailed white 
soldiers and forgot black soldiers”. Additionally, according to Janney, 
celebrations marking the end of slavery continued to bring African 
Americans onto the public stage, reminding Americans north and south that 
there were other ways to reflect on the meaning of the Civil War besides 
joint Blue and Gray reunions. “Freedom celebrations,” Janney says, 
“remained an important component of not only African American civic 
rituals, but also Civil War memory.”32  
Yet, if African American commemorations remained vibrant, 
questions persist as to their broader influence on the culture of memory. In 
The Southern Past: A Clash of Race and Memory, Fitz Brundage notes how 
the rise of segregation tended to divide black memory from white. 
Segregated black schools, churches, and organizations actively pursued the 
shaping and dissemination of black history, making scores of black youth 
and adults aware of critical events and outstanding leaders of the past but 
little, if any, of that knowledge and tradition crossed the threshold into the 
white community. Mitch Kachun likewise documents the far-flung 
commemorative events marking black emancipation but highlights pervasive 
divisions between leaders and participants, as well as an inability to agree on 
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a unified national emancipation day. Like Brundage, Kachun also contends 
that as “the age of Jim Crow set in, public commemorations generally 
became more racially circumscribed events”, with very little cross-over 
between black and white rituals. The existence of a strong black 
commemorative tradition, including in the Jim Crow South, should remind 
historians about the limits of racial repression at the turn of the nineteenth 
century. The mere presence, though, of this commemorative tradition does 
not by itself reveal the influence of an emancipationist vision in the national 
culture.33 
 
The studies that challenge the reunion and reconciliation paradigm 
give a full and detailed depiction of the memories of “ordinary” Americans, 
veterans especially, with respect to slavery and the Civil War. This 
scholarship reflects a more general shift away from the denigration, post-
Vietnam, of veterans as the agents of imperialist interests and toward a more 
complicated recognition that soldiers, including those who have fought in 
recent global conflicts, seldom embody the positions of official US policy. 
Veterans, in other words, deal with the aftermath of war, including the 
trauma of the battlefield and their own ideological principles, often in ways 
that challenge official narratives about wars. In this way, veterans express 
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what John Bodnar has called “vernacular”, as opposed to “official”, forms of 
memory. Much of the anti-reconciliation scholarship has worked hard to 
illuminate these vernacular expressions of ordinary veterans. But the 
tendency to give almost exclusive attention to former soldiers and their 
relatives, hardly the only ones discussing, enacting, or resisting 
reconciliation, has clear limitations. While veterans, and certain specific 
veterans in particular, sometimes exerted significant influence, their powers 
of persuasion were inevitably limited, especially as these men aged into 
oblivion. Even more, there’s reason to believe that Civil War veterans – at 
least when they appeared on the public stage as veterans – found themselves 
disregarded and unappreciated, even before they reached old age. As James 
Marten observes in his study of Union and Confederate veterans’ lives, men 
on both sides became increasingly defensive about protecting their legacy in 
the face of social and cultural forces that portrayed them as irrelevant to the 
real conditions of Gilded Age America. Union veterans, in particular, may 
have faced a more intense backlash from the larger society as they seemed to 
be the recipients of federal largesse – in the form of a well-endowed pension 
system – that was denied to their Confederate counterparts. And, as Brian 
Jordan suggests in Marching Home: Union Veterans and their Unending 
Civil War, civilian society, whether in the nineteenth-century North or in the 
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twenty-first century United States, has consistently demonstrated an 
immense lack of awareness of veterans’ ongoing psychological traumas. As 
Jordan explains, this gulf between the civilian and veteran experiences 
furthered a growing divide between Northern civilians’ insistence on 
“forgiving and forgetting” and the mental anguish of Union veterans. 34  
Scholarship addressing the progress, or not, of reconciliation among 
non-veterans remains surprisingly undeveloped. Edward Blum’s work fills 
in a piece of that picture, with its focus on Protestant reformers and religious 
leaders in the late nineteenth century, but the different beliefs that continued 
to keep several Protestant churches divided suggests more could be done on 
this topic. Likewise, the complicated racial politics of organizations like the 
WCTU, or the Populist Party, or the Knights of Labor – groups that often 
used the rhetoric of intersectional cooperation yet also created an 
organizational space for southern black men and women – warrants closer 
analysis. Further investigation, in fact, might reveal different versions of the 
reconciliationist narrative, some predicated specifically on the unification of 
women or workers, even the unemployed men who made up the regiments in 
“Coxey’s Army,” who championed reconciliation as a way to challenge the 
position of more powerful elites.35 
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Janney addresses the waning influence of veterans by arguing that the 
veterans’ relatives, and especially women, became the sectional stalwarts. 
Indeed, says Janney, “As the descendant organizations came to the forefront 
in the 1920s and 1930s, Civil War memory – and especially the Lost Cause 
– became increasingly feminized”. Janney even sees southern white women 
helping to make the Lost Cause a more visible, and acceptable, presence in 
American culture more broadly, a point reflected in movie audiences’ 
adoration of Scarlett O’Hara, the ultimate symbol of the southern cause in 
female garb. Still, the notion that the Lost Cause occupied a dominant place 
in early twentieth century American culture, thanks to the advocacy of 
southern white women, runs counter to a different historical trend operating 
at the same time: a tendency to belittle women’s insight and leadership in 
historical matters. In a modern era that was more focused on materialistic 
aspirations and pluralistic participation than ancestral privilege and descent, 
women’s genealogical obsessions could serve to marginalize them from the 
discussion. The southern journalist Virginius Dabney, for example, argued 
that Confederate women’s groups were, by the 1930s, “out of harmony with 
those of most Southerners.”36  
  
The Imagined Reconstitution of the Nation 
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As the discussion above suggests, scholarship on reconciliation freely 
crosses over between social history and cultural history, with many scholars 
analyzing not just letters and personal reflections of “ordinary” veterans, but 
also literature, film, songs, and public monuments. A similar crossover 
occurs between investigations of “vernacular” expressions and more 
“official” displays of memory that might have been codified in a 
government-sponsored sculpture, like the Lincoln Memorial, a national 
publication, like the Century Magazine, or a Hollywood motion picture like 
Gone with the Wind. While this approach gives a richer picture of the many 
ways the Civil War long figured in American memory, a tendency to 
conflate the different forms of remembrance can also confuse the picture, 
especially in assessing how certain memories gained traction. David Blight’s 
discussion, for example, of the Century Magazine’s “Battles and Leaders” 
series on the Civil War, with its enthusiastic celebration of reconciliation 
raises questions about the dialogue between one form of memory and 
another: did the veterans who made contributions to the Century series 
compose an apolitical accounting of the war and thus, in their writing, reveal 
the building blocks of a reconciliationist perspective? Or did the Century 
Magazine privilege a certain style and approach that helped to silence 
veterans who may have been more insistent about a particular cause? 
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Similarly, we might wonder if Hollywood’s version of Scarlett O’Hara 
reflected the strident Lost Cause-ism articulated by generations of southern 
white women, or was Scarlett the product of a different configuration of 
cultural forces, including a sensibility that resisted sectional loyalties?37  
Understanding these different perspectives requires a clearer 
appreciation of the cultural dialogue that engaged them as well as the power 
and influence that one perspective may have had over another. In elaborating 
on the distinction between “vernacular” and “official”, the historian John 
Bodnar discusses the way a “public memory emerges from the intersection 
of official and vernacular cultural expressions.” In a parallel discussion 
about public monuments, the art historian Kirk Savage likewise explains 
how “monuments emerged within a public sphere that communicated 
between actual communities of people and the abstract machinery of the 
nation-state.” Both Bodnar and Savage agree that the views of “ordinary” 
people were never wholly ignored. Vernacular concerns – like bestowing 
honor on the fallen soldiers of a particular regiment – were often part of 
public memorialization. Still, the contest between official and vernacular 
was never equal and often privileged those who spoke on behalf of the 
nation-state or who held influential positions of cultural leadership or simply 
had more resources. “Negotiation and cultural mediation,” Bodnar writes, 
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“do not preclude domination and distortion. Usually it is the local and 
personal past that is incorporated into a nationalized public memory rather 
than the other way around.”38  
Although many scholars continue to draw on the idea of “collective 
memory” in their studies about postwar reconciliation, I question the 
effectiveness of that term, especially since it can cloud the relationship 
between individual and collective memory and can obscure the way different 
types of collective memory relate to one another. Additionally, the 
distinction between “first-order” memories – shaped and expounded upon by 
those who participated in an event – and “second order” memories – the 
ideas and practices upheld by those in subsequent generations – is more 
often elided than elaborated.39 
My emphasis on the “imagined reconstitution of the nation” departs 
from the “collective memory” literature by spotlighting the problem of 
nationalism at a specific historic juncture. In this, I hope to focus attention 
on a topic that has fallen out of fashion in this era of transnational analysis, 
but one that remains vital in understanding historical events of the last two 
centuries. I am interested, too, in a cultural process that had a relationship to 
collective remembrances, but was also shaped by other forces associated 
with the formation of modern nations including the rise of mass culture, 
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consumerism, and the creation of certain types of political and economic 
infrastructures that were part of the developing nation state. In other words, 
by examining the “imagined reconstitution of the nation” I hope we can also 
gain a better understanding of some of the linkages between “reunion” (the 
structural reconstitution of the nation state) and “reconciliation” (the 
memories and new cultural narratives created about the nation). My hope, 
too, is that we can also make room for the kinds of ideas developed by 
Natalie Ring in The Problem South: that there was a tendency to imagine the 
re-constituted United States not simply in terms of “romance” but also in 
terms of colonial domination. 
Focused attention on this imagined form of reconciliation provides 
insight into other issues already considered in this essay. For one, it pushes 
us into the realm of the imagination and forces us to think about the kinds of 
creative leaps some artists and writers tried to take, even if political and 
economic circumstances imposed a more restrictive reality. This, I think, 
matters quite a bit in contemplating the question of post-Civil War racial 
attitudes and the “abandonment” of Reconstruction. Kirk Savage, for 
example, in his probing study of public monuments created in the wake of 
the Civil War finds some evidence of artists and sculptors thinking in new 
ways about African American citizenship in the early postwar years, 
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including a tendency to imagine black men as active agents in the 
emancipation process. During Reconstruction, Savage writes, “many of 
America’s most important sculptors did try to overcome the drag of 
accumulated tradition and fashion an interracial order in sculpture.” Alice 
Fahs likewise finds evidence of northern white writers incorporating strong 
black characters, especially heroic soldiers, in their fiction, helping to create 
“a new diversified nationalism in the public space of popular literary 
culture.” These accounts suggest how the wartime experience could press 
some Americans into new ways of thinking about race even if most 
politicians or newspaper editors or even soldiers remained bound to the 
weight of “accumulated tradition”. They provide glimpses to an alternative 
path that might have been pursued in making the vision of emancipation 
more meaningful.40 
A focus on the “imagined reconstitution of the nation” also compels 
us to think about the cultural dialogue that drew together the memory strands 
first elaborated in Blight’s book - “emancipationist”, “white supremacist”, 
and “reconciliationist” - as well as the “Unionist” perspective that received 
more focused attention in books by Gannon, Blair, and Janney. Moreover, in 
thinking about this national reimagining, we might also shift attention away 
from specific group memories and think more about how, and why, certain 
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types of memories could “overwhelm” others. An instructive case in point 
takes us to Stephen Prince’s Stories of the South. Prince, too, pushes back 
against the “reunion framework,” although from a slightly different 
perspective than other scholars considered thus far. “Rather than a reunion 
of two estranged regions,” Prince writes, “the postbellum decades witnessed 
the construction of a new South and a new nation”. The newly imagined 
nation, Prince contends, developed through a cultural dialogue, one that 
drew together white northerners, white southerners, and African Americans, 
and saw the creation of new stories that assessed and affirmed the place of 
the South in the United States. With this in mind, Prince considers the way 
white northerners, in the postwar decades, came to learn about slavery and 
southern race relations. One powerful perspective emerged from black 
southerners, like the men and women in the Fisk Jubilee Singers who 
performed slave spirituals in northern cities in order to raise money for Fisk 
University. Mindful of the brutal realities of slavery and dedicated to 
promoting racial justice, the Singers compelled white northern audiences to 
see their dignity and refinement as well as the accomplishments of southern 
blacks since emancipation. Yet, says Prince, the Fisk message was muted 
and distorted, perhaps even “overwhelmed,” by a competing image that 
emanated from the minstrel stage. Widely popular and pervasive throughout 
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the US, postbellum minstrel shows took a nostalgic and idealized look at 
slavery and derided the accomplishments of emancipated blacks. Unlike the 
Fisk Singers, postbellum minstrelsy incorporated numerous national touring 
companies, generally had greater funding available to publicize their 
attractions and managed to draw in sizeable audiences. When the Fisk 
Singers performed, northern white audiences compared them to minstrels. 
Indeed, it seems likely that minstrel shows shaped the racial attitudes of 
white northerners, including Union veterans, in ways we have yet to 
investigate, and impeded the path of an emancipationist perspective in the 
post-Reconstruction years.41  
A consideration of this cultural dialogue, and the unequal distribution 
of resources, should also draw our attention to the role of the nation state in 
shoring up a certain strand of Civil War memory. Although private interests 
often played a part in the preservation of battlefields and the construction of 
public monuments, the federal government exerted a critical influence when 
it imposed federal oversight on Civil War battlefields and when it 
commissioned some of the nation’s most important war memorials. Indeed, 
it is hardly coincidental that some of the fiercest pleas for intersectional 
cooperation and fraternal unity came in the 1890s, a moment not only of 
rising imperialism and military expansion, but also when battlefields were 
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brought under the jurisdiction of the US War Department. Moreover, since 
battlefield preservation focused on capturing the military contest as it 
unfolded on that site, there was little pressure to address the larger political 
causes that had provoked the war. Finally, with federal oversight came 
federal money, including funding for markers and tablets that would 
identify, in neutral terms, the military endeavors of both sides. In 1894, 
Congress authorized the creation and preservation of the Chickamauga and 
Chattanooga National Military Park under the rubric of reconciliation: to 
commemorate a victory for both Union (Chattanooga) and Confederate 
(Chickamauga). Similarly, as Thomas Brown explains, when Charleston’s 
Fort Sumter became part of a federal park system in the mid-twentieth 
century, it “heightened the vulnerability of the Lost Cause to a national 
ideological upheaval.” For years, veterans traveled to Civil War parks and 
sites and voiced the kinds of divisive and sectional attitudes that recent 
scholars have documented. Yet the parks and their tablets, as well as other 
federally approved monuments, persisted and acquired a sense of 
permanence and conclusiveness unavailable to individuals, even 
organizations, who made their remarks, perhaps even wrote them down, and 
then left.42  
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Giving attention to this cultural reimagining of the US nation, then, 
can help establish a framework for understanding the meaning of the Civil 
War, including the narrative of reconciliation, long after the historical actors 
have departed the scene. As scholars have shown, the Civil War has 
remained a vibrant touchstone well into the twentieth century, and beyond. 
Yet, although certain themes persisted, the forms in which Americans 
grappled with the Civil War changed significantly. As Mitch Kachun 
suggests, while the memory of emancipation did not necessarily continue in 
the form of Freedom Day activities in the black community, it persisted in 
new cultural forms, like music and dance, more akin to twentieth century 
amusements and entertainments. In literature, art and film, the cultural re-
imagining of the nation increasingly drew “North” and “South” and “West” 
together, with the “West” often endowed with a unique power to reconcile 
former antagonists. Likewise, a brief consideration of the way Abraham 
Lincoln emerged as a kind of modernist icon during the 1930s – in Aaron 
Copland’s music, or in paintings by Marsden Hartley and Horace Pippin – 
makes clear how much Honest Abe had morphed from his 1860s, or even 
1890s, persona. A keener understanding of the intersection of modernism 
with the memory of the Civil War would push scholars to see how new 
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cultural forms have transformed the way Americans thought about long-
standing problems of civil rights, sectionalism and regionalism.43  
As the above suggests, the “imagined reconstitution of the nation” 
compels us to give attention to the kinds of narratives that gained traction in 
the postwar years. It allows us to see how reconciliation itself might exist as 
an appealing fiction in the way it imagined separate sections, “the North” 
and “the South,” embodying different characteristics, that could be joined 
together in harmonious nationalism, or perhaps in a more troubling 
relationship of colonial conquest. In this way, the “imagined reconstitution 
of the nation” shows us the changing and sometimes contradictory ways in 
which “the South” was imagined and re-positioned in national culture.  
 In fact, as literary scholars have suggested, contradictory stories 
about “the South” have long been part of the lifeblood of the national 
imagination. Their work has much to say about why diverse and conflicting 
images of the South held appeal in a nation struggling to advance a liberal 
and democratic agenda. These studies, too, might enlighten us about the 
simultaneous embrace of romantic reunion stories, like those discussed in 
The Romance of Reunion, alongside narratives about Southern 
backwardness, like those discussed in The Problem South. Leigh Anne 
Duck, for example, suggests that understandings about “the South” between 
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1890 and 1930 “served to contain the contradictions between divergent 
models of US citizenship”, specifically between notions of civic nationalism 
which joined people together based on their commitment to a form of 
governance and cultural nationalism which drew people together based on 
traditions. Ideas about “the South”, she explains, gave Americans a way to 
justify limits to democracy, Jim Crow especially, by envisioning “the South” 
as a culturally and temporally distinct region. As she shows, this attachment 
to southern distinctiveness could also offer a means for celebrating 
“traditional values” that might respond to troubling features of industrialism, 
consumerism, and bureaucratization. This kind of scholarship can provide 
historians with crucial insights about the power of cultural narratives in 
general and how Americans may have thought through the problem of 
reconciliation by making room for conflicting, even contradictory, images of 
the South.44  
By paying attention to “the imagined reconstitution of the nation”, 
historians can better understand how there might be both a culture of 
reconciliation and resistance to it, how we might have both a triumphant 
myth of a white peoples’ reconciliation as well as “dissonant” voices that 
continued to surface with respect to a variety of subjects, like remembering 
the Appomattox surrender, or honoring the Civil War dead, or 
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commemorating emancipation. Indeed, it seems likely that the cultural 
power of the re-imagined nation made the anti-reconciliationist voices of 
Union and Confederate veterans that much louder and more insistent; yet 
that loudness and insistence, I would argue, reflected the way they had, in 
fact, lost the battle over Civil War memory. In the end, the recent 
scholarship that argues against the “reunion and reconciliation” paradigm 
has given us a more nuanced and complex portrait of the way Americans 
battled over a variety of ways to remember the Civil War. It has not, 
however, presented us with a new paradigm for understanding sectional 
relations in the post-Civil War era. Nor is it able to provide historical 
perspective on the relationship between reconciliation and racial justice and 
offer some insight about what it might take to give the emancipationist 
memory of the Civil War, at last, a more central place in US culture.45 																																																								
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#2: Postcard showing advertisement for “Birth of a Nation” playing at the 
Orpheum theater in Fargo, North Dakota (undated). (Can be obtained from 
North Dakota State University archives.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70		
	 	
																																																																																																																																																																					
#3: The Commanders of the UCV and GAR shaking hands at the Gettysburg 
reunion in 1938. (Can be obtained from Musselman Library at Gettysburg 
College.) 
 
